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QUANTIFIER SPREADING
IN THE ACQUISITION OF EVERY
BILL PHILIP & MARI TAKAHASHI
UMASS LINGUISTICS

1.1 Introduction
This study reexamines with improved methodology
the phenomenon of 'quantifier spreading' reported in
Philip & Aurelio (1990).
By correcting flaws in the
experimental paradigm, and by increasing the age-range
of the study to include preschool, kindergarten and 1st
grade children (4yrs-7yrs), we have obtained more
reliable data and a clearer picture of the phenomenon.
Our findings basically support the hypothesis of the
earlier study that a linguistic factor plays the key
role in quantifier spreading. However, there also is
evidence that a non-linguistic factor may contribute to
the phenomenon sometimes.
In addition, our experiment
has uncovered some unexpected evidence that English
speaking 5-year-olds (in contrast with 4-year-olds)
have syntactic null objects.

2.1 Review of Philip & Aurelio (1990)
It was observed in Philip & Aurelio (1990) that
(English speaking) preschoolers had a special reading
for sentences such as "Is every boy drinking a milk
We wish to thank Emmon Bach, Roger Higgins, Angelika Kratzer, Tom
Maxfield, Dana McDaniel, Ana Teresa Perez-Leroux, Bernadette
Plunkett, Meike Waverink and above all Tom Roeper and Jill de
Villiers.
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shake?" When asked this question of a picture showing
a symmetrical pairing of boys and milk shakes, children
would answer "yes" (like adults). However, for a
picture such as in (l.a) they would answer in the
negative.' The key claim of Philip & Aurelio (1990)
was that the phenomenon behind this kind of response,2
called 'quantifier spreading', could be inhibited by
varying a linguistic condition. Whereas quantifier
spreading was robustly instantiated in the sentential
context of (l.a), very little was found in the
discourse context of (l.b).
(1)

a.sentential context

b.discourse context

Is every boy drinking
a milk shake?

The fact that the children did not spread across
a sentence barrier in a discourse context---that is,
for instance, did not reject the picture in (l.b)
because it failed to show all the eggs hatching---was
taken as prima facie evidence that a linguistic analysis
of some form or other was needed for a proper
understanding of the phenomenon. Specifically, it was
speculated that the quantified phrase "every NP" was
linked somehow to the indefinite phrase "a/an NP" and
that this dependency was clause-bound due to general
linguistic constraints.
The basic claim, then, given the model in (2),
was that spreading occurred in the mapping from
linguistic to conceptual representation (A), but not
1. Indicating the extra milk shake as their reason for saying "no".

2. For Inhelder & Piaget such responses would have shown that the
child's thinking was "conditioned by a need for symmetry" (1964:70).
3. After being read the text, the children were shown the picture
and asked if it matched the text; for sentential context they were
simply asked a yes/no question of a picture.
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within the domain of conceptual representation proper
(B), nor in the interface of perception and thought
(C). Note that uncritical appeals to 'performance
factors' to account for spreading are tacitly rejected
here.
(2)

conceptual
71
(A(.....· .

(B)

lingui~iC

"

"(C)

pe~ePtual

2.2 Methodological Problems of Philip &. Aurelio (1990)
The principal problem with the experiment of
Philip & Aurelio (1990) was that the experimental tasks
and the picture-types were different for the sentential
and the discourse context items. Uncontrolled factors
may have introduced confounding effects, making it
difficult to assess the significance of the comparison
of the two linguistic conditions. In particular, as
Dana McDaniel noted (personal communication), it is
possible that on a purely perceptual basis the pictures
used with the sentential context items may have been
more suggestive of a symmetrical distributive reading
than those used for the discourse context items 4 •

3.3 Design of New Experiment
To rule out the possibility that non-linguistic
factors may have produced the observed contrast in the
linguistic conditions, the same picture-type was used
in our study for both the sentential and the discourse
contexts, as shown in (3) and (4). Also, for all test
items we used the same experimental task of matching a
text with a picture. As in Philip & Aurelio (1990), we
tested for spreading both to the right and to the left,
with every/a-type and a/every-type items, respectively.

4. Would a child not hearing "every" still spread in describing l.a?
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(3 )

every/a-type
a.sentential context

.?-~

--, ___~i~
uQ\L----.~

b.discourse context

,~L,
l@-@--l

.--D--,
~

Every mall is dril'illg a truck.
The trucks are green.

(4)

a/every-type
a.sentential context

A boy is riding every pony.

EI'ery boy is dril'ing.
A car is broken.

b.discourse context

A girl is riding.
Every elephant is sleeping.

The pictures used with every/a-type items always
showed two extra objects (e.g. the driver-less trucks
and cars in (3)), while in the case of a/every-type
items there were two extra agents (e.g. the pony-less
boys in (4.a); the elephant-less girls in (4.b)).
For
the discourse context items one of the agents was
always marked with some visually salient unique
property (e.g. the broken car in (3.b); the hat-wearing
girl in (4.b)). This was to facilitate acceptance of
the picture by a child preferring a "one-and-only-one"
reading of the indefinite article. For each pair of
formally identical pictures we used the same verb in
both the sentential and the discourse contexts. In the
sentential context the verb was overtly transitive,
having a direct object, whereas in the discourse
context it occurred as a 'pseudo-intransitive', having

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol17/iss1/14
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an implicit objectS in some sense.
In the case of the
sentential context items, we usually simplified the
text to one sentence for the sake of brevity, leaving a
few such as (4.a) to serve as controls for the possible
significance of this as a hidden bias.
Essentially, the sentential and discourse
contexts differed in two ways. First, they differed
with respect to the presence or absence of a sentence
boundary between "every" and the indefinite NP. This
was the contrast we wished to isolate. Secondly, the
two linguistic contexts varied as regards the presence
or absence of an implicit object in the first sentence
of the text. Since this was unavoidable (if we were to
use the same verb in both contexts), we attempted to
control for its possible effect on the observation of
spreading by means of an independent test (see below).
The problem was that in the comparison of spreading in
every/a-type items with that of the a/every-type items
the effect of varying the direction in which the
quantifier spread potentially would be confounded with
the effect of varying the presence/absence of an
implicit object. If an implicit object were capable of
playing the same role for the spreading quantifier as a
full NP, then the every/a-type discourse items might
really function as a special kind of sentential context
item. The quantifier would spread, but not really
across a sentence boundary since it would encounter an
implicit object to 'spread to' before reaching the end
of the same sentence. This would make it look like
there was spreading in a discourse context when there
really wasn't any in the case of every/a-type items.
The core of the experiment, then, consisted of
16 items, 4 tokens of each of the types of contexts and
orders shown in (1) and (2). A complete list of the
texts that were used is shown in the Appendix (from
which the associated pictures may be inferred). Notice
in this list that all the discourse context items
precede the sentential context items. The experiment
is arranged in this way to eliminate the possibility of
a 'carry-over' effect whereby spreading triggered in
the sentential context might artificially increase
spreading in the discourse context simply because the
children have a tendency to fixate on a pattern of
response that they gather to be the 'correct' one for a
5. We use this term theory-neutrally to denote any verb that may
occur with a direct object without change in form or meaning.
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given circumstance.
Aside from the core items, there were 4
controls. Two items of the sort shown in (5) checked
whether or not spreading could be inhibited by firmly
fixing in the discourse the reference set of the
quantifier.
(5)

•
•
In this story there are 3 pigs. Freddie. Porky and Wilbur. Now they are
in the yard. They found apples. EI'ery pig is eating all apple.
Is this the right picture?

Two instances of each of the two types of
controls in (6) investigated the effect on spreading of
the presence/absence of an implicit argument in a
pseudo-intransitive predicate.
(6)

a.true intransitive

Every dog is sleeping.

b.pseudo-intransitive

Every bo)' is riding.

Finally, the purpose of the two items shown in
(7) was to check for the (adult) collective/narrow
scope reading of "every"---indicated by in a positive
match for (7.a)---and to check for the absence of a
'one-and-only-one' existential reading of "a/an"
(i.e. "a/an"==>"one") ---indicated by a positive match
for (7.b).

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol17/iss1/14
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a.adult collective
"every"

A boy is holding

every ballool/.
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b.one-and-only-one
"a/an"

A girl is holding
every balloon.

In addition to the control items shown in (5) to
(7), we interspersed positive and negative elicitation
items in the experiment to check for attentiveness, etc.
A warm-up session preceded the experiment proper in
order (i) to teach the matching task, (ii) to show the
child that "no" could be an appropriate response, (iii)
to check for basic comprehension of "every", and (iv)
to check that the children could handle 2-sentence
texts containing universal quantification (WM3 & WM4;
see Appendix). Children who failed on two trials to
respond as an adult would for items of the warm-up
session, or who answered inappropriately for any of the
negative or positive elicitation items, were excluded
from the study.

4.1 Subjects
The subjects consisted of 36 children, of both
sexes, interviewed at day care centers and an
elementary school in the Amherst area during the fall
1989 and the spring 1990.
(8)

4-year-olds
5-year-olds
6-year-olds
7-vear-olds

number of sUbiects
9
9
7
11

mean acre
4,6
5,4
6,6
7 4

Also, four adults were tested as a control group;
they all responded in the same way (see Appendix).

5.1 Results
(A) As in the earlier study, the children
behaved as if they lacked the adult collective/narrow
scope reading of "every" for the control item in (7. a) .
Only about 1/3 of the subjects of each age group said
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that the picture in (7.a) matched the sentence that
went with it.
In contrast, 100% of the children said
the picture in (7.b) was right for its sentence. We
believe this merely reflects a response bias induced by
the experiment as a whole (cf. Philip & Aurelio, 1990).
(B) The two control items of the type
represented in (5) showed that sensitivity to
contextually determined restriction of the domain of
quantification increased gradually with age. Consider
the table in (9) (scale = 0 to 2).
P-value

(9)

.0127

(C) Comparison of the control items in (6)
revealed that overall there was a significant increase
in spreading with pseudo-intransitives as compared to
that found with true intransitives (P-value = .0015).
Consider the data in (10), where the scale is 0 to 2.
(10)

·
0

L.

·
0

L

~
«

··
~

(0) For all ages there was a significant overall
inhibition of spreading with a/every-type items in the
discourse context (P-value .011), as shown in (11).
This finding must be evaluated, however, in light of
the evidence in (C) that the absence of an implicit
object in the same sentence inhibits spreading.

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol17/iss1/14
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..

(11)

(E) The graph in (12) shows that spreading,
regardless of direction, is enhanced in a sentential
context/inhibited in a discourse context with 4-yearolds but not with any other age group. That is, age
interacts significantly with context (P-value = .0286),
but a simple effects analysis shows that context is
only significant for 4-year-olds (P-value = .008).
(12)

"
~

:;

:.
"
"
C

T.

"<

~

r
40 \

:mfl. __..

."~
--,-_..

-

(jl';:("uur<;("

sentc:nt lui

6.1 Discussion
At first our principal findings (E) seem to
suggest that quantifier spreading is a non-linguistic,
purely cognitive phenomenon and that in the earlier
study of Philip & Aurelio (1990) some uncontrolled
factor had been distorting the results. We see in (E)
that most of the children (all subjects 5 years old or
older) exhibited the phenomenon roughly 50% of the
time, irrespective of the type of linguistic context.
Thus, initially it looks as though (i) in general
spreading is just as likely to occur as not to occur,
and (ii) its occurrence is not conditioned by
linguistic factors.
These general observations, if
really valid, would support a perceptual account or a
cognitive hypothesis along the lines of Inhelder &
Piaget (1964) whereby the phenomenon reflected passage
through a stage in the development of general reasoning
capabilities.
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A closer look at the data, however, reveals a
number of difficulties for a perceptual or cognitive
hypothesis. First, even without looking beyond the
findings in (E), there is a problem explaining the
behavior of the 4-year-olds. For them quantifier
spreading across a sentence barrier is severely
restricted (only 35% of the time) while spreading
within the same sentence is significantly enhanced (85%
of the time). Recalling that the same picture was used
for both the sentential and the discourse context
items, we are compelled to reject any purely perceptual
account of spreading with these younger children.
Likewise, it's hard to see how the 4-year-olds' data
can be explained in any straight-forward manner by a
general cognitive hypothesis that makes no reference to
linguistic input. Given, then, the need to posit the
involvement of linguistic principles in the quantifier
spreading found with younger children, a cognitive or
perceptual hypothesis is faced with a developmental
problem that amounts, we feel, to a reductio argument
against it. such a cognitive account must accept a
developmental sequence of events in which a non-adultlike reasoning or perceiving process originates as a
linguistically determined phenomenon but goes on to
become a general cognitive phenomenon that is virtually
independent of linguistic input. Although perhaps
intriguing, surely such a view of cognitive development
is highly implausible.
At this point there seem to be two alternative
responses available to the advocate of a cognitive or
perceptual account: either find some way to explain
away the data for the 4-year-olds or accept a 'dualcause' hypothesis.
The first approach is to cast doubt on the
purity of the facts for the younger children and to
propose that some additional performance factor is at
work in the case of the 4-year-olds but not in the case
of the older children. specifically, it has been
suggested by Phillipe Rochat (personal communication)
that perhaps the 4-year-olds systematically ignore the
quantified sentence in the text of the discourse
context items and only check the picture against the
'less complex' unquantified sentence. Since this
latter sentence always matched the picture, the
children would have always answered in the affirmative
for such items. In other words, although it looked as
though spreading were being inhibited in the discourse
context, actually it was the effect of a performance

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol17/iss1/14
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limitation and an 'avoid quantifier' strategy that was
being observed.
Although more research is needed to determine
for all the age groups in the study the extent to which
non-linguistic performance problems may affect the
responses of the children, we already have strong
evidence against a performance-theoretical account of
the 4-year-olds' data. We can refute conclusively, in
any case, the specific proposal mentioned above. Of
the four every/a-type items used to check for spreading
in the sentential context, two were given the same form
as discourse context items by adding an extra sentence.
Thus, for example, in (3.a) "The trucks are green" is
included (see also item 18; Appendix) so that the text
of (3.a) is formally comparable to (3.b) in terms of
length. We found that there~was not a single 4-yearold who failed to spread with these two items! None of
them accepted the pictures as matching the text; they
all rejected the pictures, pointing to the extra,
agentless objects as their reason. This clearly shows
that the 4-year-olds had no 'avoid quantifier' strategy
in dealing with the 2-sentence texts. Thus, we argue
that performance factors play no significant role in
the inhibition of spreading in the discourse context
with the youngest children. Notice, furthermore, that
a performance-theoretical approach is inherently
insufficient since it could only explain half of the
observations in any case. An additional stipulation
would always be needed to account for the fact that the
4-year-olds also spread more than the norm in the
sentential context (85% against 50%).
So far we have only considered the facts in (E).
The difficulties increase for non-linguistic accounts
when we turn to the facts presented in the (e) and (D).
First, observe in (D) that for all age groups there was
a big difference between spreading across a sentence
barrier in a rightward direction (every/a-type) and
spreading across a sentence barrier in a leftward
direction (a/every-type). A comparable contrast was
not found with sentence internal spreading. There is
no way that a purely perceptual hypothesis can account
for this, since the same picture was used in both
cases. A performance-theoretical account can also be
rejected since it would amount to the claim that all
children (even 7 year olds!) could not, or would not,
attend to a quantified sentence if it was the second
sentence of a text although they would do so if it was
the first sentence of a text. In the first place any
child having this curious way of dealing with discourse
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context items would have been systematically excluded
from the experiment by a failure to pass warm-up item
#3 (see Appendix)6. The problem, now, is that without
the support of a performance hypothesis a nonlinguistic cognitive account has no obvious way of
relating the facts in (E) to the facts in (D). That
is, assuming there is no linguistic contribution to the
phenomenon, why should the temporal order in which a
quantified sentence is registered in conceptual
representation have any bearing on the spreading
phenomenon?
Finally, consider the facts in (C). Overall,
there was a significant decrease in spreading with true
intransitive verbs as compared to that found with
pseudo-intransitives. Clearly, neither a perceptual
nor a non-linguistic performance hypothesis can shed
any light on this contrast; not only were the picturetypes the same in both cases but so were the texttypes. The only way even to begin to formulate an
analysis of this fact is by recognizing the
significance of the implicit object in the complement
of pseudo-intransitive verbs.
Thus, we are compelled
to abandon the strong cognitive hypothesis once and for
all.
The second approach available to the advocate of
a cognitive hypothesis is to adopt a weakened, dualcause account (cf. Donaldson & Lloyd, 1974) in which
quantifier spreading may be determined by a combination
of linguistic and a cognitive factors.
In the case of
the 4-year-olds, then, both factors would be operative,
whereas with the older children only the cognitive
factors would be at work. The developmental claim,
then, would be that at around 5 years of age the
setting of some parameter in the child's grammar would
have as one of its ramifications a sudden disappearance
of the linguistic contribution to the phenomenon,
leaving only the cognitive factor responsible for
subsequently observed effects. Assuming that general
conceptual development is gradual and continuous, it
would be no surprise, then, to find that some spreading
persisted for many years, as observed.
The difficulty for the dual-cause hypothesis is
that it must posit the disappearance of the linguistic
6. To pass WM3 the child had to reject a picture which failed to
satisfy the truth conditions of a univerally quantified sentence.
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factor around the age of 5 to account for the behavior
of the 4-year-olds and yet must refer to a linguistic
factor to account for the facts in (D) and (e) with
older children. Thus, the hypothesis must posit two
distinct linguistic factors, one disappearing but the
other persisting in its effects. Such complications
argue against the dual-cause hypothesis if a linguistic
hypothesis alone can account for the core phenomenon.
At first, a purely linguistic account, such as
the Adverbial Quantifier Hypothesis proposed in Philip
& Aurelio (1990), seemed counter-indicated by the fact
that spreading occurred about half the time in both
discourse and sentential contexts. In light of the
observations of (e) and (D), though, we see that this
initial assessment was invalid. What (e) and (D) show
is that the presence of an implicit object generally
increases the likelihood of quantifier spreading for
children 5 and older. Therefore, since half of the
discourse context items consisted of an initial
quantified sentence containing an implicit object,
spreading should actually have been expected at least
half the time for the discourse context items. In
effect, the presence of an implicit object transformed
a discourse context into a sentential context in the
case of the every/a-type items. Given this account, it
is not implausible to attribute the additional
occurrence of spreading in the discourse context as due
to a response bias (i.e. the tendency to get 'fixed
ideas' discussed in Philip & Aurelio, 1990). That is,
having started spreading in contexts where the
phenomenon is conditioned, the children continue to do
so 'imaginatively' in other contexts where it is not
conditioned simply because they have adopted a
'spreading strategy' for dealing with "every". We find
abundant independent evidence of this bias in several
places (the data in (A), (B) & (e».
Note that
attributing the unpredicted occurrence of spreading to
a specific performance-theoretical hypothesis is quite
different from making a vague appeal to 'performance
factors' to explain away undergeneration.
Finally, the Adverbial Quantifier Hypothesis of
Philip & Aurelio (1990) provides the basis for a
natural account of the facts observed with 4-year-olds.
If we hypothesize that these younger children do not
yet project a syntactic position for implicit objects
with pseudo-intransitives, then the sharp contrast
between the discourse and sentential contexts may be
directly predicted. A verb lacking a syntactically
real implicit object would have no reflex of the

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1991

13

University of Massachusetts Occasional Papers in Linguistics, Vol. 17 [1991], Art. 14

296

PHILIP & TAKAHASHI

implicit argument in spreading because there would be
nothing for the quantifier to 'spread to'. In other
words, with respect to spreading the 4-year-olds
treated pseudo-intranstives just like true intranstives
(they would see no difference, for instance, between
(lob)

&

(J.b».

Turning to the actual proposal, under the eventvariable version of the Adverbial Quantifier
Hypothesis, for all ages spreading in a sentential
context is accounted for by the way in which logical
form is derived in a version of Heim's (1982)
framework. Thus, for a sentence such as "Every boy is
driving a car" when the tripartite structure maps off
of syntactic form, "every" has the scope of a
sentential adverb, binds an event-variable and is
restricted by a clause derived from object NP (cf.
Heim's 'NP-Prefixing'), as schematized in (13).
(13)

Q

I

EVERYe
i.e.

Every boy is driving a car

R

e involves a car

S

~~

a boy is driving(e) a car

for every event e such that a car is involved,
a boy is driving a car

Similarly, for all ages the left-spreading found
with sentences such as "A boy is driving every car" is
accounted for by positing for the child a logical form
such as in (14).
(14)

Q

I

EVERYe
i.e.

R

I

e involves a boy

/~

a boy is driving(e) a car

for every event e such that a boy is involved,
a boy is driving a car

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol17/iss1/14
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The Adverbial Quantifier Hypothesis successfully
accounts for the core phenomenon and therefore counts
as a good initial hypothesis for a linguistic analysis.
However, there remain some problems. First, as noted
in Philip & Aurelio (1990), the hypothesis is
incomplete in that it offers no explanation of what
determines the contents of the restrictive clause.
Furthermore, there is an empirical problem. As it
stands, the hypothesis predicts that the spreading
child would accept as a good match for the sentence in
(13) a picture showing 5 boys but only 3 cars (2 boys
not driving). Although such picture-types were not
tested with every/a-type sentences in this study, we
know from Philip & Aurelio (1990) that the spreading
child would not make this response.
Turning to the case of pseudo-intransitive verbs
such as "drive", by positing that children 5 years old
and older project a syntactic position in the verb's
complement---and fill this object position with, say,
small pro---we may account for the greater incidence of
spreading found with such verbs in terms of the logical
form in (15). The null object is incorporated into the
restrictive clause just as if it were a full NP7.
(15)

Q

I

EVERYe
[pro
i.e.

Every boy is driving

R

I

e involves a pro
car]

S

~~

a boy is driving(e) a pro

for every event e such that e involves it
[it is a car], there is a boy driving it

The big difference, then, between the 4-year-old
and the 5-year-old would be that, lacking syntactic
null objects, the 4-year-old could not derive the
logical form in (15) for "every boy is driving."
Instead he or she would have the same logical form for
a verb like "drive" as for a verb like "sleep", as
shown in (16). Nothing could be raised to the
restricted clause and therefore spreading would not
occur (for linguistic reasons).
7. The null object refers in the same way that unbound pronouns do.
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(16)

Q

Every boy is driving

----------r----------

EVEkye
i.e.

for every event e,
there is a boy driving

S

~

/'
a boy is driving(e)
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APPENDIX
texts (showinq type , adult response)
+ = every/a
S = sentential context

- = a/every
D = discourse context
CPI = pseudo intransitive (implicit object control)
CI
true intransitive (implicit object control)
CR = contextually restricted domain of quantification
CD = control for collective/narrow scope reading of
every
CX = control for "stron9''' wide scope existential a/an
NE, PE = negative/posit~ve elicitation (attention
control)
item type Adult

WMI
WM2
WM3
WM4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Y
N
N
Y
+0
+0
-0

Y

N
Y

NE
+0
-0

Y

CPI
CR

CI

+s

15

+s

19
20
21

22
23
24

Y

Y
N

14

17
18

Y

NE
+0
-0
-0

13

16

Y

-s

PE

+s

-s
-s

+s

-s

CO

cpr

25

CR

26

CI

27

CX

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
YN
Y

Y
YN
YN
Y
YN
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

texts

A girl is swimming. A fish is watching.
A man is taking a picture.
A woman is taking a picture. Every man is eating.
Every man is working. A boy is running.
Every boy is driving. A car is broken.
Every elephant is pushing.
A tree is on the ground.
A man is baking. Every cake is burnt.
Every man is working.
Every boy is eating. An ice cream is melting.
A man is climbing. Every tree is tall.
A girl is riding. Every elephant is asleep.
A boy is running. Every man is eating.
Every man is reading. A newspaper is rolled up.
A girl is painting. Every picture is yellow.
Every boy is riding.
In this story there are three pigs, Freddie,
Porky, and Wilbur. Now they are in the yard. They
found apples. Every pig is eating an apple.
Every man is sitting.
Every man is driving a truck.
The trucks are green.
Every boy is pushing a wheelbarrow.
A man is drawing every picture.
A girl is drinking.
Two dogs have collars. Every dog is eating a bone.
A cat is climbing every ladder.
A boy is riding every pony.
Every girl is reading a book.
A girl is baking every cake.
A boy is holding every balloon.
Every boy is driving.
In this story there are three rabbits, father
rabbit, mother rabbit, and baby rabbit. Now they
are in a garden. They found carrots.
Every rabbit is eating a carrot.
Every dog is sleeping.
A girl is holding every balloon.
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